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Article
Vagueness Challenges to the Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act
Orin S. Kerrt
INTRODUCTION
In 1984, Congress enacted a narrow statute designed to
criminalize unauthorized access to computers.' That law, gen-
erally referred to as the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
(CFAA),2 has been substantially modified five different times.3
The statute's reach has been expanded each time, resulting in a
remarkable cumulative effect.4 The statute, originally designed
to criminalize only important federal interest computer
crimes,5 potentially regulates every use of every computer in
the United States and even many millions of computers abroad.
Statutory amendments and the increasing computerization of
American society have combined to render the CFAA one of the
most far-reaching criminal laws in the United States Code.
This Article argues that the remarkable scope of the CFAA
requires courts to adopt narrow interpretations of the statute
in light of the void-for-vagueness doctrine. Violations of the
t Professor, George Washington University Law School. By way of full
disclosure, I provided pro bono representation to Lori Drew, the defendant in
one of the cases discussed. All of the viewpoints expressed in this Article
represent my personal opinion. Thanks to Eugene Volokh, Paul Ohm, and
Chris Slobogin for helpful comments and discussions of these topics. Copyright
© 2010 by Orin S. Kerr.
1. See Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 2102(a), 98 Stat. 2190, 2190-92.
2. Technically speaking, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act was the
1986 amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 1030. See Pub. L. No. 99-474, 100 Stat. 1213
(1986). However, it is common to refer to § 1030 as a whole as the Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act. I adopt that convention here.
3. See infra Part I.
4. See infra Part I.
5. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(1)-(3) (Supp. II 1985) (criminalizing certain
computer misuse relating to national security, financial records, and govern-
ment property).
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CFAA generally require an unauthorized access-either an
"access without authorization" or an act that "exceed[s] autho-
rized access."6 The meaning of unauthorized access is remarka-
bly unclear, however, with courts and commentators disagree-
ing sharply as to how much conduct counts and what principle
of authorization the statute adopts.7 The void-for-vagueness
doctrine requires courts to adopt narrow and clear interpreta-
tions of unauthorized access to save the constitutionality of the
statute.8 The CFAA has become so broad, and computers so
common, that expansive or uncertain interpretations of unau-
thorized access will render it unconstitutional. Such interpreta-
tions would either provide insufficient notice of what is prohi-
bited or fail to provide guidelines for law enforcement in
violation of the constitutional requirement of Due Process of
the law. 9
This Article focuses on two recent criminal prosecutions
that have been based on very broad interpretations of unautho-
rized access. In United States v. Drew,'0 the government argued
that violations of Terms of Service (TOS) render access to a
computer unauthorized." In United States v. Nosal,12 the gov-
ernment argued that an employee who accesses an employer's
computer with illicit motives to hurt the employer accesses that
computer without authorization. 3 Both theories must be re-
jected. Because the statute would be unconstitutionally vague
under either theory, courts must construe the CFAA narrowly
as excluding such theories to avoid invalidating the statute.
More broadly, this Article predicts a new, judicially focused
phase of the CFAA's development. Since the statute's initial
enactment in 1984, most of the action relating to the CFAA's
meaning has come from Congress.14 Congress has revisited the
6. See Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrime's Scope: Interpreting 'Access" and 'Au-
thorization" in Computer Misuse Statutes, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1596, 1616 (2003)
(reviewing 18 U.S.C. § 1030 provisions).
7. See id. ("The courts that have interpreted 'access' and 'without autho-
rization' have offered a broad range of interpretations that run the gamut from
quite narrow to extraordinarily broad.").
8. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56 (1999) (noting
that a criminal statute may be invalidated if it "authorize[s] ... arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement").
9. See infra Part II.A.
10. 259 F.R.D. 449 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
11. Id. at 457.
12. No. CR 08-00237 MHP, 2009 WL 981336 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2009).
13. Id. at *4.
14. See infra Part I.
[94:15611562
2010] COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE ACT
statute repeatedly, while courts have generally declined to
scrutinize the meaning of the statute's key terms.15 That will
change. The CFAA has become too broad to apply without care-
ful attention to the vagueness doctrine. With Congress having
largely abandoned its task of defining what the statute prohi-
bits,16 the courts are now likely to step in and fill the gap. The
meaning of unauthorized access will become a question for the
courts rather than Congress.17
This Article contains two Parts. Part I explains just how
broad the CFAA has become. The short history of the CFAA
provides a case study in how readily Congress can expand crim-
inal liability in areas of developing technology. Congress has
given the Executive remarkably broad discretion to charge cas-
es that the Executive thinks should be charged. The core legis-
lative question of what conduct should be criminalized has been
all but abandoned. Part II argues that Congress's failure to lim-
it the CFAA requires courts to limit the Act using the constitu-
tional vagueness doctrine. The remarkable scope of the CFAA
requires courts to adopt a narrow interpretation of the core
prohibition of access "without authorization" and "exceeding
authorized access."
I. THE EVER-EXPANDING COMPUTER FRAUD AND
ABUSE ACT
This Part traces the history of the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act. It focuses on how Congress has repeatedly expanded
the CFAA's scope and abolished the statutory limits on its ap-
plication. It starts with the first version of § 1030 enacted in
1984. It then covers each major amendment through 2008. The
history shows a clear and uniform trend of expansion. The law
that began as narrow and specific has become breathtakingly
broad.
A. COMPREHENSIVE CRIME CONTROL ACT OF 1984
In October 1984, Congress passed a massive omnibus
crime bill known as the Comprehensive Crime Control Act
15. See Kerr, supra note 6, at 1617 ("(S]everal recent decisions point to-
ward remarkably expansive interpretations of unauthorized access.").
16. See infra Part II.B.
17. The Supreme Court's recent scrutiny of the "honest services" statute,
18 U.S.C. § 1346, may make such a future much more likely. See Mark Sher-
man, Court Skeptical of Federal Anti-Fraud Law, DENV. POST, Dec. 8, 2009,
http://www.denverpost.com/business/ci-13949538.
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(CCCA).18 Among the hundreds of provisions in the CCCA was
the first federal computer crime statute, found in section
2102(a). 19 The new statute, to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1030,
established three new federal crimes. All three crimes applied
to a person who "knowingly accesses a computer without au-
thorization, or having accessed a computer with authorization,
uses the opportunity such access provides for purposes to which
such authorization does not extend . ."20 Each offense then
added requirements that collectively limited the statute to
three specific scenarios: computer misuse to obtain national se-
curity secrets, computer misuse to obtain personal financial
records, and hacking into U.S. government computers. 21
The first offenses protected classified national security se-
crets. Codified at § 1030(a)(1), it prohibited a person from ac-
cessing a computer without authorization to obtain classified
national security information with the intent or reason to be-
lieve that the information would be used to injure the United
States. 22 The second crime protected personal financial infor-
mation. Codified at § 1030(a)(2), it prohibited a person from ac-
cessing a computer without authorization to obtain information
contained in a financial record of a financial institution or in a
file of a consumer reporting agency.23 The third offense pro-
tected U.S. government computers. Codified at § 1030(a)(3), it
prohibited a person from accessing a computer without autho-
rization and then using, modifying, destroying, or disclosing in-
formation from a U.S. government computer if so doing affected
the computer's operation.24 All three statutes were tailored to a
specific government interest: national security, financial
records, and government property.
B. COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE ACT OF 1986
Congress significantly expanded the statute just two years
later when it passed Pub. L. No. 99-474, formally known as the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, the amendments that gave
18. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98
Stat. 1976.
19. See id. § 2102(a), 98 Stat. at 2190.
20. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(1)-(3) (Supp. II 1985). For the sake of simplicity, I
will refer to this language as simply a prohibition on "access without authori-
zation" or "unauthorized access."
21. Id.
22. Id. § 1030(a)(1).
23. Id. § 1030(a)(2).
24. Id. § 1030(a)(3).
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§ 1030 its name.25 The 1986 Act added three new prohibitions
codified at § 1030(a)(4)-(6). 26 Section 1030(a)(4) prohibited un-
authorized access with intent to defraud; essentially, the tradi-
tional crime of wire fraud committed using a computer.27 Sec-
tion 1030(a)(5) prohibited accessing a computer without
authorization and altering, damaging, or destroying informa-
tion, thereby causing either $1,000 or more of aggregated loss
or impairing a medical diagnosis, treatment, or care of one or
more individuals. 28 Section 1030(a)(6) prohibited trafficking in
computer passwords.29
All three of the new statutes contained new definitions de-
signed to delineate which computers were covered under the
new federal prohibitions. Both § 1030(a)(4) and § 1030(a)(5)
were limited to "Federal interest" computers. Roughly speak-
ing, federal interest computers were those used either by the
U.S. government or financial institutions, or as part of a mul-
tistate computer network. 30 The statute defined "Federal inter-
est" computers as follows:
(A) exclusively for the use of a financial institution or the United
States Government, or, in the case of a computer not exclusively for
such use, used by or for a financial institution or the United States
Government and the conduct constituting the offense affects the use
of the financial institution's operation or the Government's operation
of such computer; or
(B) which is one of two or more computers used in committing the
offense, not all of which are located in the same State[.]31
Note that the definition in subset (A) largely tracks the
coverage of the original 1984 statute, whereas the definition in
subset (B) covers new ground. That new ground was quite lim-
ited, however, as it effectively required an interstate offense
over an interstate network.32 At a time when use of the Inter-
net remained in its infancy, few crimes would be included in its
reach.
25. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-474, 100 Stat.
1213.
26. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4)-(6) (Supp. IV 1987).
27. Id. § 1030(a)(4).
28. Id. § 1030(a)(5).
29. Id. § 1030(a)(6).
30. Id. § 1030(e)(2).
31. Id.
32. See S. REP. No. 99-432, at 4 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2479, 2482 (detailing the preference of the Senate Judiciary Committee to lim-
it federal jurisdiction over computer crime to instances involving a "compelling
federal interest" or where "the crime itself is interstate in nature").
2010] 1565
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C. VIOLENT CRIME CONTROL AND LAW ENFORCEMENT ACT OF
1994
The next material amendments to § 1030 occurred eight
years later with the passage of the Violent Crime Control and
Law Enforcement Act of 1994.33 This law was another omnibus
criminal law bill that contained hundreds of sections, passed at
the behest of President Bill Clinton, and most famous at the
time for the federal assault weapons ban.34 Section 290001 of
the Act provided amendments subtitled the Computer Abuse
Amendments Act of 1994.35 The 1994 amendments expanded§ 1030(a)(5), the computer damage statute, to apply to comput-
er damage incurred accidentally and even without any negli-
gence. 36 The statute also added a civil provision to allow victims
of § 1030 crimes to recover damages against wrongdoers. 37
D. ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE ACT OF 1996
The next expansion of § 1030 occurred in 1996 as title II of
the Economic Espionage Act, in a subtitle known as the Na-
tional Information Infrastructure Protection Act of 1996.38 This
law dramatically expanded the statute in three different ways.
The first change vastly expanded the scope of § 1030(a)(2),
which was originally limited to unauthorized access that ob-
tained financial records from financial institutions, card issu-
33. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-322, 108 Stat. 1796.
34. See generally William Jefferson Clinton, Remarks on Signing the Vio-
lent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 20 U. DAYTON L. REV.
567 (1995); Bill McCollum, The Struggle for Effective Anti-Crime Legislation-
An Analysis of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 20
U. DAYTON L. REV. 561 (1995).
35. Computer Abuse Amendments Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit.
XXIX, 108 Stat. 2097.
36. Id. § 290001(b), 108 Stat. at 2097-98.
37. Id. § 290001(d), 108 Stat. at 2098. At the time, the civil provision stated:
Any person who suffers damage or loss by reason of a violation of the
section, other than a violation of subsection (a)(5)(B), may maintain a
civil action against the violator to obtain compensatory damages and
injunctive relief or other equitable relief. Damages for violations of
any subsection other than subsection (a)(5)(A)(ii)(II)(bb) or
(a)(5)(B)(ii)(II)(bb) are limited to economic damages. No action may be
brought under this subsection unless such action is begun within 2
years of the date of the act complained of or the date of the discovery
of the damage.
18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) (1994).
38. See Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-294, tit. II, 110
Stat. 3488, 3491.
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ers, or consumer reporting agencies. 39 The 1996 amendments
expanded the prohibition dramatically to prohibit unauthorized
access that obtained any information of any kind so long as the
conduct involved an interstate or foreign communication. 40
Prior legislative history emphasized the tremendous reach of
this new amendment by clarifying that obtaining information
included simply reading it.41 Since most forms of unauthorized
access will reveal information to read, even if it is only the
prompts or graphic interface provided to those with access, the
new § 1030(a)(2) effectively criminalized all interstate hacking.
Second, the 1996 amendments added new provisions to the
computer damage prohibition, added a new felony enhance-
ment to § 1030(a)(2), and added a computer extortion statute at
§ 1030(a)(7). The new computer damage section expanded the
list of harm that counted as damage: beyond monetary damage
(raised to $5,000 from $1,000) and impairing a medical diagno-
sis or treatment, the law added causing "physical injury to any
person" or "threaten[ing] public health or safety" to the list.42
The felony enhancements to § 1030(a)(2) turned a misdemeanor
violation into a felony if the offense was conducted in further-
ance of any crime or tortious act, if it was conducted for pur-
poses of financial gain, or if the value of the information ob-
tained exceeded $5,000.43
Finally, the 1996 amendments expanded the statute dra-
matically by replacing the decade-old category of "Federal in-
terest" computers with the new category of "protected comput-
er[s]." As enacted in 1996, a protected computer was defined as
a computer:
(A) exclusively for the use of a financial institution of the United
States Government, or, in the case of a computer not exclusively for
such use, used by or for a financial institution or the United States
Government and the conduct constituting the offense affects that use
by or for the financial institution or the Government; or
(B) which is used in interstate or foreign commerce or communica-
tion[.]44
39. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2) (Supp. II 1996).
40. See id. § 1030(a)(2)(C).
41. See S. REP. No. 99-432, at 6 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2479, 2484 (noting that "obtaining information" in the statute includes "mere
observation of the data").
42. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(8)(A)-(D).
43. Id. § 1030(c)(2)(B)(i)-(iii).
44. Id. § 1030(e)(2).
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The critical difference between a "Federal interest" com-
puter and a "protected computer" was that the former required
computers in two or more states, while the latter merely re-
quired a machine "used" in interstate commerce.45 Notably, the
statute did not specify whether "use" in interstate commerce re-
ferred to use in the context of the charged offense or rather use
in the general sense. However, the change in the definition
changed the scope of the statute dramatically. Because every
computer connected to the Internet is used in interstate com-
merce or communication,46 it seems that every computer con-
nected to the Internet is a "protected computer" covered by 18
U.S.C. § 1030.
E. USA PATRIOT ACT OF 2001
The USA Patriot Act, passed soon after the terrorist at-
tacks of September 11, 2001, also contained provisions expand-
ing the scope of 18 U.S.C. § 1030.47 The amendment appears in
section 814 of the Act, labeled "Deterrence and Prevention of
Cyberterrorism."48 The most significant amendment to the
scope of § 1030 in the Patriot Act was the expanded definition
of "protected computer" to include computers located outside
the United States. 49 Specifically, the amendment added those
computers "located outside the United States that [are] used in
a manner that affects interstate or foreign commerce or com-
munication of the United States."50 As we will see shortly, the
terms "affects interstate commerce" is a term of art in Federal
Commerce Clause law.51 The amendment effectively extended
the CFAA to as many foreign computers as the Commerce
Clause allows. 52
45. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2)(B) (Supp. IV 1987) (defining a "Feder-
al interest" computer as one "which is one of two or more computers used in
committing the offense, not all of which are located in the same State"), with
18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2)(B) (Supp. II 1996) (defining a "protected computer" as
one "which is used in interstate or foreign commerce or communication").
46. See infra notes 65-73 and accompanying text.
47. See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of
2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272.
48. Id. § 814, 115 Stat. at 382.
49. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2)(B) (Supp. II 2004).
50. Id.
51. See infra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
52. See infra notes 60-65 and accompanying text.
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Second, the Patriot Act added new triggers for the felony
violations of § 1030(a)(5). The Act added damage to any com-
puter "used by or for a government entity in furtherance of the
administration of justice, national defense, or national security"
to the list of harms that, if caused, trigger the felony computer
damage provisions of § 1030(a)(5).53
F. IDENTITY THEFT ENFORCEMENT AND RESTITUTION ACT OF
2008
The most recent expansions to 18 U.S.C. § 1030 were
enacted in September 2008 as title II of the Former Vice Presi-
dent Protection Act, 54 subtitled the Identity Theft Enforcement
and Restitution Act. This amendment once again expanded the
scope of the CFAA, and it did so in subtle ways that have a
surprisingly large impact.
Three changes are most notable. First, the statute once
again expanded the scope of § 1030(a)(2) by removing the re-
quirement of an interstate communication.5 5 Under the new
§ 1030(a)(2)(C), any unauthorized access to any protected com-
puter that retrieves any information of any kind, interstate or
intrastate, is punishable by the statute.56 The statute also once
again expanded the reach of § 1030(a)(5), creating misdemea-
nor liability for harms under $5,000 and adding once again to
the list of felony triggers-this time, harming ten or more com-
puters, designed to cover cases of botnets.5 7
The third significant expansion is the most subtle but the
most far-reaching. The 2008 amendments once again expanded
the definition of "protected computer."58 Therefore, the present
definition includes any computer that is:
(A) exclusively for the use of a financial institution or the United
States Government, or, in the case of a computer not exclusively for
such use, used by or for a financial institution or the United States
Government and the conduct constituting the offense affects that use
by or for the financial institution or the Government; or
(B) which is used in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or
communication, including a computer located outside the United
53. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(B)(v); see § 814(a)(4), 115 Stat. at 382.
54. Former Vice President Protection Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-326,
122 Stat. 3560.
55. See id. § 203, 122 Stat. at 3561.
56. See id.
57. See id. § 204, 122 Stat. at 3561-62.
58. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(e)(2) (West 2000 & Supp. 2009).
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States that is used in a manner that affects interstate or foreign
commerce or communication of the United States[.]59
It is easy to miss the change. Congress added "or affecting"
in the first phrase of § 1030(e)(2)(B), replacing the definition
that included computers "used in interstate or foreign com-
merce or communication" with computers "used in or affecting
interstate or foreign commerce or communication."60
But sometimes two words make a big difference. The
phrase "affecting interstate commerce" is a term of art that
signals congressional intent to cover as far as the Commerce
Clause will allow.6' Modern Commerce Clause doctrine gives
,the federal government the power to "regulate purely local ac-
tivities that are part of an economic 'class of activities' that
have a substantial effect on interstate commerce." 62 In applica-
tion, that allows Congress to regulate any class of economic ac-
tivities that when aggregated can impact interstate com-
merce. 63 In Gonzales u. Raich, for example, the Supreme Court
allowed Congress to regulate entirely local activities like grow-
ing marijuana for home use on the theory that the aggregate
effect of homegrown marijuana could have an impact on the
supply and demand for marijuana in the national economy. 64
No matter how local the marijuana growing, Congress could
still regulate it.
This excursion into Commerce Clause doctrine explains
just how broad the current version of "protected computer"65
has become, and by extension, just how far the CFAA reaches.
Because the definition now applies to both computers in the
United States and abroad that are used in or affecting inter-
state commerce or communication, every computer around the
world that can be regulated under the Commerce Clause is a
"protected computer" covered by 18 U.S.C. § 1030.66 This does
not merely cover computers connected to the Internet that are
actually "used" in interstate commerce. 67 Instead, it applies to
59. Id.
60. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2)(B) (2006), with 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(e)(2)
(West 2000 & Supp. 2009) (emphasis added).
61. See United States v. Chesney, 86 F.3d 564, 571 (6th Cir. 1996).
62. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005) (quoting Perez v. United
States, 402 U.S. 146, 152 (1971)).
63. See id.
64. See id. at 18-19.
65. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(e)(2) (West 2000 & Supp. 2009).
66. See id.
67. See id.
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all computers, period, so long as the federal government has
the power to regulate them.68
The 2008 amendments of the CFAA and the nearly limit-
less scope of modern Commerce Clause doctrine mean it may be
no exaggeration to say that a "protected computer" now just
means a "computer."69 Computers are ubiquitous as tools of
modern commerce, and intrastate use of computers often has
interstate effects. Computer data created and used in one state
is easily moved across state lines, and breaches of computer se-
curity among intrastate computers can have an effect on com-
puter use generally. 70 It would be premature to rule out Com-
merce Clause challenges to intrastate use of computers in all
cases. If limits exist, however, they likely are very narrow
ones.71 Perhaps the only identifiable exclusion from the scope of
protected computers is a "portable hand held calculator, or oth-
er similar device,"72 exempted from the definition of "comput-
er." Everything else with a microchip or that permits digital
storage is, arguably, covered. 73
II. THE VOID-FOR-VAGUENESS DOCTRINE AND
UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS STATUTES
The vast scope of the current version of 18 U.S.C. § 1030
places tremendous pressure on the particular meaning of
''access without authorization" and "exceeds authorized access,"
the two closely related prohibitions at the heart of the CFAA. 74
As I have written elsewhere, the meaning of these terms re-
mains surprisingly uncertain.76 These terms may only prohibit
68. See id.
69. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(e)(1) defines a "computer" as:
an electronic, magnetic, optical, electrochemical, or other high speed
data processing device performing logical, arithmetic, or storage func-
tions, and includes any data storage facility or communications facili-
ty directly related to or operating in conjunction with such device, but
such term does not include an automated typewriter or typesetter, a
portable hand held calculator, or other similar device[.]
70. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Attorney's Office, Dist. of Mass., Former
Inmate Sentenced for Hacking Prison Computer (Dec. 22, 2009), available at
http://www.cybercrime.govt/janoskosent.pdf (illustrating how a person hacking
one prison computer can have a significant effect on the lives of hundreds of
government officials outside prison walls).
71. Cf. United States v. Jeronimo-Bautista, 425 F.3d 1266, 1273-74 (10th
Cir. 2005).
72. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(e)(1).
73. Cf. United States v. Mitra, 405 F.3d 492, 496 (7th Cir. 2005).
74. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(a)(2).
75. See Kerr, supra note 6, at 1597.
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accessing a computer in a way that circumvents code-based re-
strictions such as password gates.76 Alternatively, they may
prohibit accessing a computer in a way that violates a contract
or widely shared norms of computer use.7 7 Exactly what is an
"access," and what makes an "access" unauthorized, is present-
ly unclear.
This Part shows how courts should apply the constitutional
void-for-vagueness doctrine to require narrow interpretations of
unauthorized access in the CFAA. The void-for-vagueness doc-
trine requires legislatures to say what is prohibited. 78 It prohi-
bits legislatures from essentially delegating the decision as to
what is criminal to the executive branch.79 The remarkable
growth of the CFAA has made the void-for-vagueness doctrine
a critical weapon for challenging overbroad interpretations of
the Act. As the statute grows in scope, the constitutional void-
for-vagueness doctrine places increasing pressure on courts to
adopt narrow interpretations of access and authorization. Only
a narrow construction of the statute can save its constitutional-
ity.80
This Article focuses on two specific applications featured in
recent criminal prosecutions. The first is whether an Internet
user violates the CFAA when she violates Internet Terms of
Service (TOS), a question raised by United States v. Drew.81
The second application is whether an employee violates the
CFAA when he accesses his employer's network for personal
reasons contrary to the employer's interest, a question dis-
cussed by the court in United States v. Nosal. 82 In both cases,
the void-for-vagueness doctrine should force the conclusion that
neither conduct is prohibited by the CFAA. The acts of violating
TOS and acting contrary to an employer's interest, without
more, should not constitute either an access without authoriza-
tion or exceeding an authorized access. In my view, Drew and
Nosal are easy cases. At the same time, they are illustrative
easy cases. The arguments in Drew and Nosal should be re-
76. See id. at 1619-21.
77. See id. at 1622-24.
78. See discussion infra Part II.A.
79. See discussion infra Part II.A.
80. See discussion infra Part II.B.
81. 259 F.R.D. 449, 451 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
82. No. CR 08-00237 MHP, 2009 WL 981336, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 13,
2009).
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peated in other settings to pressure the courts to adopt narrow
interpretations of the CFAA.
A. INTRODUCTION TO THE VOID-FOR-VAGUENESS DOCTRINE
The void-for-vagueness doctrine is rooted in the Due
Process Clause.83 It includes two distinct and largely indepen-
dent tests: fair notice and discriminatory enforcement. 84 The
fair notice test asks whether the law is "so vague and standard-
less that it leaves the public uncertain as to the conduct it pro-
hibits."85 If a law is so vague that a person cannot tell what is
prohibited, "it leaves judges and jurors free to decide, without
any legally fixed standards, what is prohibited and what is not
in each particular case."86
Importantly, the fair notice standard assumes that the
public knows the legal precedents construing the statute's
terms. For example, if a criminal statute uses a term of art, or
employs language that has been construed narrowly by the
courts, that legally recognized meaning applies and can save
the statute from being vague.87 As a result, the fair notice in-
quiry focuses on what a lawyer, judge, or legally informed juror
might think the law means rather than a member of the pub-
lic. 88 This focus may seem odd, as most people aren't lawyers
and don't hire them to analyze vague criminal laws. The focus
serves an important purpose, however: it permits courts to ad-
dress vagueness concerns by interpreting a vague law in a clear
way.89 The clear interpretation becomes the new meaning.90 As
a result, courts confronted with a vague law can either invali-
date the law or construe it narrowly to cure the vagueness.91
83. United States v. Williams, 128 S. Ct. 1830, 1845 (2008).
84. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56 (1999).
85. Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 402 (1966).
86. Id. at 402-03.
87. See Wainwright v. Stone, 414 U.S. 21, 22-23 (1973) ("For the purpose
of determining whether a state statute is too vague and indefinite to constitute
valid legislation 'we must take the statute as though it read precisely as the
highest court of the State has interpreted it."').
88. See id.
89. See id.
90. See id.
91. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 64, 92, 112 (1999)
(invalidating a Chicago ordinance under a broad reading while the dissent
would have upheld the statute under a narrow reading).
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Coates v. City of Cincinnati illustrates a law that failed the
fair notice test.92 A Cincinnati, Ohio ordinance made it a crimi-
nal offense for "three or more persons to assemble" on side-
walks and to "there conduct themselves in a manner annoying
to persons passing by."93 The Supreme Court of Ohio had not
adopted a narrow construction of the word "annoying." The
Ohio court had written that "the word 'annoying' is a widely
used and well understood word; it is not necessary to guess its
meaning."94 The U.S. Supreme Court held that the statute, so
construed, was unconstitutionally vague:
Conduct that annoys some people does not annoy others. Thus, the
ordinance is vague, not in the sense that it requires a person to con-
form his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative stan-
dard, but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified
at all. As a result, 'men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning.'5
The ordinance failed to say in what way, and by what
standard, the conduct was annoying. As construed by the Ohio
Supreme Court, the ordinance had effectively failed to say what
was prohibited.96
The second void-for-vagueness test addresses discriminato-
ry enforcement.97 Under this test, a statute is unconstitutional-
ly vague if it does not "establish minimal guidelines to govern
law enforcement,"98 so that the law "encourage[s] arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement."99 The constitutional flaw in this
setting is not what the law means to a potential violator, but
rather how the law is or would be enforced by the police in
practice. 00 The inquiry focuses on how much discretion the law
gives the police.101 If the law leaves its enforcement to the
"whim of any police officer," 102 it is unconstitutionally vague for
its failure to provide minimum guidelines.103 This can be re-
92. Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 616 (1971).
93. See id. at 611 (quoting CINCINNATI, OHIO, CODE § 901-L6 (1956)).
94. Id. at 612 (quoting City of Cincinnati v. Coates, 255 N.E.2d 247, 249
(Ohio 1970)).
95. Id. at 614 (quoting Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391
(1926)).
96. See id.
97. See, e.g., Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983).
98. Id. at 358.
99. Id. at 357.
100. See id. at 358.
101. See Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 90 (1965).
102. Id.
103. See id.
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lated to the fair notice vagueness test, in that a law that is un-
clear on its face may also give the police too much power to en-
force it as officers wish.104 But it focuses on a different question:
how the police would enforce the law rather than whether the
law is unclear.105
Kolender v. Lawson provides an example of a law that did
not establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement.106
A California statute required persons stopped by the police to
give the officer "credible and reliable" identification and to ac-
count for his presence.107 The Supreme Court struck down the
statute on the ground that the standard gave the police too
much power to pick and choose whom to arrest. 08 According to
the Court, the law gave "no standard for determining what a
suspect has to do in order to satisfy the requirement to provide
a 'credible and reliable' identification."109 As a result, the law
vested "virtually complete discretion in the hands of the police
to determine whether the suspect has satisfied the statute and
must be permitted to go on his way in the absence of probable
cause to arrest."10
B. VOID FOR VAGUENESS AND THE CFAA
This section argues that the void-for-vagueness doctrine
requires courts to adopt a narrow interpretation of unautho-
rized access. The basic argument has two stages. First, courts
must adopt a clear theory of what makes access unauthorized
to provide sufficient notice as to what is prohibited. The inter-
pretation must make clear to potential wrongdoers what is
prohibited so they can do more than merely guess at the mean-
ing of the statute."' Second, courts must adopt a narrow theory
to avoid encouraging discriminatory enforcement.11 2 The re-
markable breadth of this statute requires courts to adopt a
clear and narrow interpretation of unauthorized access to pro-
vide fair warning to individuals and to limit government discre-
tion.
104. Compare Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358, with Shuttlesworth, 382 U.S. at 90.
105. Compare Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358, with Shuttlesworth, 382 U.S. at 90.
106. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. See Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 402-03 (1966).
112. See Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358.
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The core difficulty is that access and authorization have a
wide range of possible meanings. In particular, the definition of
authorization is notoriously uncertain. 113 What makes access to
a computer unauthorized-either "without authorization" or "in
excess of authorization?"1 1 4 IS it unauthorized if the computer
owner tells the person not to access the computer? Is it unau-
thorized if the access is against the interests of the computer
owner? Is it unauthorized if the access violates a contract on
access?115 Presently the answer is remarkably unclear.116 To be
sure, there are some obvious cases. If A guesses B's password,
and logs into B's e-mail account to read B's e-mail, A's access to
the computer is clearly unauthorized: A has hacked into B's ac-
count. If hacking is not unauthorized access, nothing is. But the
courts have not yet settled on the broader question of what ex-
actly makes access without authorization or in excess of autho-
rization.1 7 The statute simply does not define what makes
access "without authorization." As a result, there are a surpris-
ing number of instances in which citizens cannot know whether
their conduct amounts to an unauthorized access. 118 The sta-
tutes simply do not say what the terms mean, and no prece-
dents have provided clear answers. 119
The requirement that a statute must "establish minimal
guidelines to govern law enforcement" 120 requires courts to re-
ject the broader possible theories of authorization. The CFAA is
breathtakingly broad.121 The statute essentially makes it a fed-
113. See United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 458 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (not-
ing "there is a considerable amount of controversy" as to the meaning of "with-
out authorization"); see Kerr, supra note 6, at 1622-24 (discussing ambiguities
in the concept of authorization to access computers).
114. See Kerr, supra note 6, at 1630 ("Although courts have struggled to
distinguish between these two phrases, prohibitions against exceeding autho-
rization appear to reflect concerns that users with some rights to access a
computer network could otherwise use those limited rights as an absolute de-
fense to further computer misuse.").
115. See id. at 1637-40 (describing cases in which two parties are "bound
by a contract that implicitly or explicitly regulates access to a computer, and
one side uses the computer in a way that arguably breaches the contract").
116. See id, at 1640-42 (discussing the courts' difficulties with interpreting
"unauthorized access").
117. Id.
118. See Kerr, supra note 6, at 1598-99.
119. See generally id. at 1624-32 (discussing the conflicting definitions of
"access" and "authorization" in case law).
120. Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574 (1974).
121. See A. HUGH ScoTT & KATHLEEN BURDETTE SHIELDS, COMPUTER AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CRIME: FEDERAL AND STATE LAW 4-3 (Supp. 2006)
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eral crime to access without authorization or exceed authorized
access to any computer at all anywhere in the world.122 As a re-
sult, the meaning of unauthorized access determines the scope
of the statute.123 Courts must adopt a meaning of unauthorized
access that does not let the police arrest whomever they like.
This means that courts must reject interpretations of unautho-
rized access that criminalize routine Internet use or that pun-
ish common use of computers. An interpretation that crimina-
lizes routine computer use would give the government the
power to arrest any typical computer user. Courts must adopt a
narrower view to limit the discretion of law enforcement au-
thorities to bring charges at their whim.
The scope of the CFAA is the heart of the problem. When
the CFAA was a narrow statute, it was constitutionally per-
missible to adopt a broad construction of access and lack of au-
thorization.124 Computers were relatively rare at the time, and
only certain types of computers used in particular ways were
covered by the statute.125 That is not true today. Today, com-
puters are everywhere. Nearly every computer is a "protected
computer" under the statute. 126 Just think of the common
household items that include microchips and electronic storage
devices, and thus will satisfy the statutory definition of "com-
puter."127 That category can include coffeemakers, microwave
ovens, watches, telephones, children's toys, MP3 players, refri-
gerators, heating and air-conditioning units, radios, alarm
("Congress has steadily increased the breadth of the coverage of the
CFAA .... Thus, invasion of or damage to any computer connected to the In-
ternet, or to the information on those computers .. . is now a federal crime un-
der 18 U.S.C. § 1030.").
122. See id. at 4-25 to -26.
123. See id. at 4-16 ("[T]he notion of 'accessing' a computer is central to the
CFAA .... ).
124. See id. at 4 -3 ('The original 1984 version of the statute was limited to
protecting federal government computers, defense or foreign relations infor-
mation of the United States, and information of a financial institution or cre-
dit reporting agency.").
125. See Kerr, supra note 6, at 1641 (describing the development of com-
puter technology since the 1970s).
126. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(e)(2)(B) (West 2000 & Supp. 2009) ("[T]he term
'protected computer' means a computer . . . which is used in or affecting inter-
state or foreign commerce or communication .... ).
127. Id. § 1030(e)(1) ("mhe term 'computer' means an electronic, magnetic,
optical, electrochemical, or other high speed data processing device performing
logical, arithmetic, or storage functions, and includes any data storage facility
or communications facility directly related to or operating in conjunction with
such device .... ).
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clocks, televisions, and DVD players, in addition to more tradi-
tional computers like laptops or desktop computers. 128 Plus, the
definition of "computer" arguably extends to flash drives, CDs,
DVDs, and other electronic storage devices, as the definition
"includes any data storage facility ... directly related to or op-
erating in conjunction with" an "electronic, magnetic, optical,
electrochemical, or other high speed data processing device per-
forming logical, arithmetic, or storage functions." 129
Under the current version of 18 U.S.C. § 1030, any action
that accesses such a device or exceeds authorized access, per-
haps even anywhere in the world, will trigger liability under
the statute so long as some information--any information-is
obtained. 130 There is no requirement of an interstate network,
an interstate communication, or an interstate computer. 131 Re-
gardless of what interpretation Congress may have intended
for access and authorization in the 1980s, and regardless of
what early cases have held, the current version of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1030 requires a narrow and clear interpretation of unautho-
rized access to avoid constitutional vagueness.
C. UNITED STATES v. DREWAND TERMS OF SERVICE
The role of vagueness doctrine in the proper interpretation
of the CFAA is particularly clear in the case of Internet Terms
of Service violations. This issue arose in the recent prosecution
of Lori Drew, a case in which I served as co-counsel for Drew
and raised these arguments myself in the District Court.132
128. Id. ("The term 'computer'... does not include an automated typewri-
ter or typesetter, a portable hand held calculator, or other similar de-
vice .... ). Perhaps future courts will construe "other similar device" broadly
to exempt common items that have been computerized, but as of now we have
no sign that courts will take that approach. See, e.g., United States v. Mitra,
405 F.3d 492, 495 (7th Cir. 2005) (adopting a broad interpretation of
§ 1030(e)(1), limited only by its explicit exceptions).
129. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(e)(1).
130. Id. § 1030(a)(2)(C) ("Whoever ... intentionally accesses a computer
without authorization or exceeds authorized access, and thereby obtains
. . . information from any protected computer ... shall be punished. . . .").
131. SCOTT & SHIELDS, supra note 121, at 4-25 (explaining that the broad
definition of protected computer combined with a global Internet means that
home computers with online access fall within the CFAA's reach).
132. See United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
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The Lori Drew case has been widely reported in the na-
tional media,133 and I suspect many readers will be familiar
with it. Drew helped create a false profile on the MySpace.com
social networking site in order to contact a neighbor of the
Drew family, thirteen-year-old Megan Meier.134 The profile
falsely claimed to belong to an attractive sixteen-year-old boy
named Josh Evans. 135 The apparent purpose of creating the
fake profile was to have "Evans" communicate with Meier and
to learn what Meier was saying about Drew's daughter.136
"Evans" communicated with Meier for a few weeks until "he"
told Meier that he was moving away.137 On October 16, 2006,
less than a month after the "Josh Evans" account was created,
Meier received an instant message from "Evans" saying that he
no longer liked her and that "the world would be a better place
without her in it."138 Later that same day, Meier committed
suicide.139
The government's theory in the Drew case was that the
creation of the "Josh Evans" profile had violated the TOS of
MySpace.com, and that the TOS violation rendered the access
to MySpace's computers either without authorization or in
excess of authorization.14 0 The TOS stated that its provisions
governed access rights to MySpace:
This Terms of Use Agreement ("Agreement") sets forth the legally
binding terms for your use of the Services. By using the Services, you
agree to be bound by this Agreement ... . You are only authorized to
use the Services (regardless of whether your access or use is intended)
if you agree to abide by all applicable laws and to this Agreement.
Please read this Agreement carefully and save it. If you do not agree
with it, you should leave the Website and discontinue use of the Ser-
vices immediately. 141
133. See, e.g., Times Topics: Lori Drew, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/
reference/timestopics/people/d/lori.drew/index.html?sp=l-spot&sq=Lori%20
Drew&st=cse (last visited Apr. 12, 2010).
134. Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 452.
135. Id.
136. Christopher Maag, A Hoax Turned Fatal Draws Anger But No
Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2007, at A23 ("In a report filed with the Sher-
iff's Department, Lori Drew said she created the MySpace profile of 'Josh
Evans' to win Megan's trust and learn how Megan felt about her daughter.").
137. Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 452.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Indictment at 6, Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449 (No. 08-00582), 2008 WL
2078622.
141. Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 454.
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The TOS then offered a series of restrictions that were re-
levant to the creation of the Evans profile. It required that "all
registration information you submit is truthful and accurate,"
that the user will not solicit "personal information from anyone
under 18" and that the user cannot include "a photograph of
another person that you have posted without that person's con-
sent."142 The government argued that the group that had
created and used the Josh Evans profile had violated these
terms-they were not really a teenage boy named Josh Evans,
they solicited information from Meier, and they included a pic-
ture of a boy alleged to be Josh Evans without the boy's permis-
sion. 143 The government argued that these TOS violations ren-
dered the access to MySpace's computers either without
authorization or in excess of authorization. 144
The defense argued two main points.145 First, as a matter
of statutory construction, the TOS did not govern authoriza-
tion.146 Regardless of what the TOS said, MySpace had in fact
given authorization to access its computers by creating the
Josh Evans account and allowing the group to send and receive
messages using it.147 Second, as a matter of constitutional law,
an interpretation of unauthorized access that included violating
website TOS would render the statute void for vagueness.148 As
a result, the statute had to be interpreted more narrowly to ex-
clude mere TOS violations.149
Judge Wu agreed with the defense and granted the motion
to dismiss. 150 On one hand, Judge Wu reasoned that he saw no
reason as a matter of statutory interpretation to construe the
142. Id.
143. Indictment, supra note 140, at 6-7.
144. Id. at 9.
145. See Notice of Motion; Motion to Dismiss Indictment for Vagueness,
Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449 (No. 08-00582), 2008 WL 2848959.
146. Id.
147. See Supplement to Rule 29 Motion at 4, Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449 (No. 08-
00582), 2008 WL 5381025 ("If a person or business actually grants permission
for the act, conditioned on some understanding that turns out to be false, then
the act is still authorized for the purposes of criminal law.").
148. Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 464 ("[I]f a website's terms of service controls
what is 'authorized' and what is 'exceeding authorization' . . . section
1030(a)(2)(C) would be unacceptably vague because it is unclear whether any
or all violations of terms of service will render the access unauthorized, or
whether only certain ones will."); see Reply to Government Response to De-
fense Rule 29 at 5-6, Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449 (No. 08-00582), 2009 WL 54313
(outlining the defense's arguments regarding the fair warning canons).
149. Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 464-65.
150. Id. at 468.
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statute narrowly. 15 1 Because the language of the TOS specifi-
cally denied rights to access the computer in ways that violated
the TOS, it ordinarily should govern authorization. 1 52 On the
other hand, Judge Wu recognized that this reading could not be
adopted under the void-for-vagueness doctrine.153 If any viola-
tion of any TOS rendered access unauthorized, then the statute
would encourage discriminatory enforcement. 154 It "would re-
sult in transforming § 1030(a)(2)(C) into an overwhelmingly
overbroad enactment that would convert a multitude of other-
wise innocent Internet users into misdemeanant criminals." 55
According to Judge Wu:
It is unclear that every intentional breach of a website's terms of ser-
vice would be or should be held to be equivalent to an intent to access
the site without authorization or in excess of authorization. This is
especially the case with MySpace and similar Internet venues which
are publicly available for access and use. However, if every such
breach does qualify, then there is absolutely no limitation or criteria
as to which of the breaches should merit criminal prosecution. All
manner of situations will be covered from the more serious (e.g. post-
ing child pornography) to the more trivial (e.g. posting a picture of
friends without their permission). All can be prosecuted. Given the
"standardless sweep" that results, federal law enforcement entities
would be improperly free "to pursue their personal predilections."156
On the other hand, a ruling that some TOS-governed au-
thorization but others did not would render the statute void for
vagueness for its failure to provide sufficient notice as to what
was prohibited. 57
Judge Wu's holding that an interpretation of unauthorized
access that includes all TOS violations would render the sta-
tute unconstitutionally vague is clearly correct. TOS are writ-
ten extremely broadly to give providers a right to cancel ac-
151. See id. at 459-60.
152. Id. at 462 ("[T]he vast majority of the courts (that have considered the
issue) have held that a website's terms of service/use cannot define what is
(and/or is not) authorized access vis-a-vis that website.").
153. Id. at 465 ("[B]y utilizing violations of the terms of service as the basis
for the section 1030(a)(2)(C) crime, that approach makes the website owner-
in essence-the party who ultimately defines the criminal conduct. This will
lead to further vagueness problems.").
154. See id. at 463-65 (noting the ability of website owners to "unilaterally
amend . . . the terms with minimal notice to users" and stating that statutes
that do not define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness encourage
discriminatory enforcement).
155. Id. at 466.
156. Id. at 467 (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983)) (ci-
tation omitted).
157. Id. at 463.
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counts and not face any liability. 15 8 Because they are written so
broadly, most Internet users violate them regularly. Violating
the TOS is the norm, complying with them the exception. In-
deed, Meier had violated the TOS as well. 159 Meier had created
her account in violation of the TOS stating that no one under
the age of fourteen could use MySpace.160 Even the cofounder of
MySpace, Tom Anderson, violated the TOS in creating his pro-
file.161 In late 2007, it was revealed that Anderson's profile mis-
represented his age in an apparent effort to seem younger. 162
The key point is that no one actually treats TOS as if they
govern access rights. Few people bother to read them, much
less follow them. Internet users routinely click through such
agreements on the assumption that they are legal mumbo jum-
bo that don't impact what users are allowed to do. 163 As a re-
sult, criminalizing TOS violations would for the most part give
the government the ability to arrest anyone who regularly uses
the Internet. Agents could set up a webpage, dontvisithere.gov,
announce that no one could visit the webpage, and then swoop
in and arrest anyone who did.
In my view, Drew was an easy case. The government's
theory was an enormous stretch. It is no surprise that both
state and federal prosecutors where both Drew and Meier were
158. See generally Jessica R. Friedman & Gerry A. Fifer, Website Develop-
ment and Hosting Agreements for Terms of Service, in REPRESENTING THE
NEW MEDIA COMPANY 2000, at 467, 476-81 (2000) (PLI Patents, Copyrights,
Trademarks, & Literary Property, Course Handbook Series No. 587, 2000)
(providing website owners with an overview of points to consider in drafting a
Terms of Service agreement).
159. See Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 466.
160. Id.
161. The Terms of Service require that "all registration information you
submit is truthful and accurate." Id. at 454.
162. Jessica Bennett, Is Age Just a Number?, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 5, 2007,
http://www.newsweek.comlid/62330 ("According to public documents obtained
by NEWSWEEK-including professional license information, voter registra-
tion and utility and telephone service applications-Anderson is five years
older than he claims.").
163. See Jacob Rogers, A Passive Approach to Regulation of Virtual Worlds,
76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 405, 420 (2008) ("The typical consumer does not read a
terms-of-service contract because the costs of doing so (primarily the time
spent reading) outweigh the benefits, which are most often essentially zero.").
The forewoman of the Lori Drew jury appears to be a rare exception. When she
spoke to the press after the trial, she expressed the view that she "always"
read Terms of Service and that a person "absolutely" should be held liable if
they are "lazy" and do not read the entire agreement. See Kim Zetter, Jurors
Wanted To Convict Lori Drew of Felonies, but Lacked Evidence, WIRED, Dec. 1,
2008, http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2008/12/jurors-wanted-t/.
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located declined prosecution on the ground that no crime was
committed.164 At the same time, the basic strategy in Drew can
be repeated in other cases that are less clear. Congress has
largely given up defining what the CFAA covers and placing
limits on its scope. That task now falls to the courts. The courts
now must use vagueness arguments to chisel away at the edi-
fice of the CFAA until the resulting scope of the statute is both
relatively clear and relatively narrow.
D. UNITED STATES v. NOSAL AND DISLOYAL EMPLOYEES
The second important theory of the CFAA that implicates
the void-for-vagueness doctrine is its use in the employment
setting. In the last five years, cases applying the CFAA to alle-
gedly disloyal employees have become by far the most common
type of CFAA case. Most of these cases are on the civil side of
the docket, and they have sharply divided the lower courts. 165
But the CFAA's role in regulating employee use of an employ-
er's computer network also arose in a recent criminal prosecu-
tion, United States v. Nosal.66
David Nosal was a high-level executive at a large company,
Korn/Ferry International (KFI), which provides executive re-
cruitment services. 16 7 In October 2004, Nosal left KFI and
signed a noncompete agreement. 168 According to the govern-
ment, however, Nosal secretly made a deal with KFI employee
Becky Christian and Nosal's former assistant, known in the
case only by the initials "J.F."169 Under the deal, Christian and
J.F. would use their KFI accounts to obtain trade secrets and
other confidential information from KFI and would provide
them to Nosal.170 Nosal could then use the information to start
a competitor business.171 Nosal and Christian were charged
with a range of crimes, among them violations of 18 U.S.C.
164. See Ashley Surdin, Woman Guilty of Minor Charges for MySpace
Hoax, WASH. POST, Nov. 27, 2008, at A10.
165. See, e.g., Shamrock Foods Co. v. Gast, 535 F. Supp. 2d 962, 964-65 (D.
Ariz. 2008) (detailing the split among courts over the meaning of the word "au-
thorization" in the CFAA).
166. No. CR 08-00237 MHP, 2009 WL 981336, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 13,
2009).
167. Id. at *1.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Superseding Indictment at 2-3, Nosal, 2009 WL 981336 (No. CR 08-
00237 MHP).
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§ 1030(a)(4). 172 Section 1030(a)(4) is the computer fraud provi-
sion of the CFAA.173 It prohibits unauthorized access to a com-
puter to further a scheme to defraud.174
The Nosal case is the first criminal prosecution that tests
whether an employee violates the CFAA by accessing his em-
ployer's computer for personal reasons. In the civil setting,
some courts have taken the view that an employee's authoriza-
tion is implicitly bounded by whether he is acting as the em-
ployer's agent.175 By acting contrary to the employer's interest
and accessing the employer's computer in a way designed to
hurt the employer, the thinking goes, that access is unautho-
rized. 176 In contrast, other courts have rejected the agency
theory of the CFAA.177 Those courts have reasoned that an em-
ployee who is authorized to access an employer's computer is,
well, authorized to use the employer's computer.178 The even-
tual or attempted misappropriation of the employer's data does
not render the access unauthorized. 179
172. Nosal, 2009 WL 981336, at *2.
173. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(a)(4) (West 2000 & Supp. 2009).
174. Id. ("Whoever . . . knowingly and with intent to defraud, accesses a
protected computer without authorization, or exceeds authorized access, and
by means of such conduct furthers the intended fraud and obtains anything of
value .. . shall be punished .... ).
175. See, e.g., Int'l Airport Ctrs., L.L.C. v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418, 420-21 (7th
Cir. 2006) (distinguishing this case in what appears to be dicta by finding that
"Citrin's breach of his duty of loyalty terminated his agency relation-
ship ... and with it his authority to access the laptop, because the only basis
of his authority had been that relationship"); see also Katherine Mesenbring
Field, Agency, Code, or Contract: Determining Employees' Authorization Under
the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 107 MICH. L. REV. 819, 823-24 (2009)
(outlining the agency-based interpretation of authorization and the Seventh
Circuit's adoption of it in Citrin).
176. See Kerr, supra note 6, at 1632-37 (describing several cases in which
employees exceeded authorized use by using "their employers' computers in
ways that exceeded the scope of their employment").
177. See Nosal, 2009 WL 981336, at *5.
178. See id.
179. The Nosal court cited a line of cases in which the courts "generally
reasoned that the CFAA is intended to punish computer hackers, electronic
trespassers and other 'outsiders' but not employees who abuse computer
access privileges to misuse information derived from their employment." Id. at
*5. See, e.g., Bridal Expo, Inc. v. van Florestein, No. 4:08-cv-03777, 2009 WL
255862, at *10 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 3, 2009); Black & Decker (US), Inc. v. Smith,
568 F. Supp. 2d 929, 933-34 (W.D. Tenn. 2008); Diamond Power Int'l, Inc. v.
Davidson, 540 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1341-43 (N.D. Ga. 2007); B & B Microscopes
v. Armogida, 532 F. Supp. 2d 744, 758 (W.D. Pa. 2007); Brett Senior & Assocs.,
P.C. v. Fitzgerald, No. 06-1412, 2007 WL 2043377, at *2-4 (E.D. Pa. July 13,
2007); Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Speed, No. 6:05-CV-1580-ORL-31, 2006 WL
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The defense in Nosal argued that the court should adopt
the narrower construction as a matter of statutory interpreta-
tion and therefore dismiss the indictment.180 Judge Patel rec-
ognized the division in the case law, but she opted for the
broader interpretation.1 8 1 That choice didn't last for very long.
A few weeks after the district court decision in United States v.
Nosal,182 the Ninth Circuit rejected the broader interpretation
in a civil case, LVRC Holdings v. Brekka,183 which therefore
has controlling effect on further proceedings in the Nosal pros-
ecution. But the more interesting question is how the void-for-
vagueness arguments could have been used by Nosal to argue
in favor of the narrower interpretation.
Does the void-for-vagueness doctrine require courts to re-
ject the broader agency view of authorization in the CFAA? I
believe it does. To see why, we need to recognize that many
employees routinely use protected computers in the course of
their day for a tremendously wide range of functions. Employee
use of computers tracks employee attention spans. Attention
wanders, and our computer use wanders with it. We think,
therefore we Google. As a result, it is rare, if not inconceivable,
for every keystroke to be clearly and strictly in the course of
furthering an employment relationship. The best employee in a
larger company might spend thirty minutes writing up a re-
port, and then spend one minute checking personal e-mail and
twenty seconds to check the weather to see if the baseball game
after work might be rained out. He might then spend ten more
minutes working on the report followed by two minutes to
check the online news. Over the course of the day, he might use
the computer for primarily personal reasons dozens or even
hundreds of times.
The checking of personal e-mail, viewing a weather report,
or loading up a new site is the modern equivalent of getting up
to stretch, or to talk briefly with a coworker. It is downtime,
time spent recharging mental batteries. And yet because it uses
a computer, it is also technically "accessing" a protected com-
puter.184 Each visit, each checking, and each viewing involves
2683058, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 1, 2006); Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace
Workers v. Werner-Masuda, 390 F. Supp. 2d 479, 499 (D. Md. 2005).
180. Nosal, 2009 WL 981336, at *4.
181. Id. at *5-6.
182. Id.
183. 581 F.3d 1127, 1132-35 (9th Cir. 2009).
184. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(e)(2) (West 2000 & Supp. 2009) (defining "pro-
tected computer").
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entering a command into a computer network and retrieving
information from a server. Assuming that using a computer to
retrieve information "accesses" that computer, 85 the interpre-
tation that courts give to lack of authorization ends up deter-
mining whether these keystrokes amount to federal crimes.
The interpretation of unauthorized access must give em-
ployees sufficient notice of what is criminal and also provide
sufficient guidelines to law enforcement to avoid discriminatory
enforcement. Interpreting the CFAA to prohibit employee
access of an employer's computer for reasons outside the em-
ployment context runs afoul of that command. First, the theory
gives employees insufficient notice of what line distinguishes
computer use that is allowed from computer use that is prohi-
bited. The key consideration seems to be motive, but the em-
ployee has no way to determine what motives are illicit-and in
the case of mixed motives, what proportion are illicit. Is use of
an employer's computer for personal reasons always prohi-
bited? Sometimes prohibited? If sometimes, when? And if some
amount of personal use is permitted, where is the line? If use of
an employer's computer directly contrary to the employer's in-
terest is required, how contrary is directly contrary? Is mere
waste of the employee's time enough? The cases generally deal
with the dramatic facts of an employee who accessed a sensitive
and valuable database to gather data that could be used to es-
tablish a competing company. But how sensitive does the data-
base need to be? How valuable does the data need to be? The
agency theory of liability under the CFAA does not appear to
answer these questions. It does not answer what kind of em-
ployee conduct is actually prohibited, and it therefore does not
provide sufficient notice to employees as to what is prohibited
to satisfy the void-for-vagueness doctrine.
To the extent the agency theory prohibits any access to an
employer's computer that does not further the employer's inter-
ests, and is therefore outside the scope of employment, the law
does not "establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforce-
ment" and therefore "encourage[s] arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement."186 Employees routinely use their employers'
computers for personal reasons. The question is not whether
employees use employers' computers for personal reasons; it is
how often and for how long. But under the agency theory of au-
185. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
186. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-58 (1983) (citing Smith v. Go-
guen, 415 U.S. 566, 574 (1974)).
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thorization, the question of how often and how long is irrele-
vant. A single unauthorized use, even if just for an instant,
amounts to either an access without authorization or exceeding
authorized access. As a result, a broad agency theory of autho-
rization would turn millions of employees into criminals. It
would give the government the power to arrest almost anyone
who had a computer at work, much like the government's
theory in the Lori Drew case would give the government the
power to arrest almost anyone who used MySpace.com.
CONCLUSION
The CFAA is a remarkably broad statute, and the recent
prosecutions in Drew and Nosal show that federal prosecutors
eventually will try to exploit the breadth and ambiguity of the
statute to bring prosecutions based on aggressive readings of
the statute. Vagueness doctrine should be a major tool to fight
those aggressive readings. The doctrine prohibits overly un-
clear or overbroad interpretations of the statute, and it should
push courts to adopt reasonably clear and reasonably narrow
interpretations of unauthorized access.
Faced with the uncertainty of the new world of computer
crimes, Congress has opted for very broad and unclear prohibi-
tions. The pressure to interpret the CFAA to avoid vagueness
concerns may lead to a new court-created jurisprudence of the
meaning of unauthorized access. The void-for-vagueness doc-
trine will force courts to answer the questions that Congress
has failed to answer. The pressure to interpret the CFAA in a
constitutional way will force courts to say what unauthorized
access means for employees, for Internet service users, and for
other computer users in the many different settings in which
the CFAA might apply.
Exactly what approaches the courts will allow and which
they will reject is unclear. Drew and Nosal are easy cases. More
difficult cases remain. But it seems fair to predict that we are
entering into a new phase of the development of the CFAA.
Congress has largely given up, and the courts are now likely to
step in. In coming years, the meaning of unauthorized access-
and with it, the meaning of § 1030-is likely to be seen as a
constitutional question for the courts rather than a statutory
question for Congress.
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